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September 11,2001 was a wake up call. Many of us, however, are still
asking ourselves exactly what we woke up to and how it should define our
domestic and foreign policy.
Appreciating the exceptional nature of the threat, the government has
embarked on an aggressive campaign to contain and defeat the
international terrorist conspiracy. At home, this strategy is reflected in the
prevention paradigm. Abroad, this strategy manifests itself as the doctrine
of preemption.'
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B., J.D., Harvard University.
Many thanks to Robert Smith and Erin Murphy for invaluable research assistance and the editors
of the FloridaLaw Review for their editorial contributions.

I. See NAT'L SEC. CouNCE, WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURriY STRATEGY OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
nsc/nss.pdf ("[T]he United States will, if necessary, act preemptively."). President Bush has also
personally voiced this sentiment:
[T]he war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to
the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge.
In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action, and this
Nation will act.
President's Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New
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The twin manifestations of this preventive strategy in domestic and
foreign policy have attracted many comments-some nuanced, most
critical, and a few apocalyptic. Despite their variety and predominantly
negative approaches, these commentaries generally adopt the premise that
what happened on that day was so unprecedented and unimaginable that
it rocked our world-and that world would change forever.
,In some ways this premise is correct. We were awakened from our
democratic innocence--or what a law professor from a perspective much
different from mine called our "puerile arrogance" 2 -and realized that
there are people out there who not only reject our institutions, ideals, and
values, but also find them so offensive that they would give up their lives
to take the lives of innocents and upend all that we hold dear.
Some reject the notion that September 11 was special, and they see
political conspiracy lurking in the shadow of September 11
exceptionalism. Accusing the Bush Administration of engaging in a "plot
against history," historian Marilyn Young concludes that "its ruthless
cunning . ..is demonstrated everywhere."3 Hyperventilating rhetoric
aside-and it is rhetoric, because I do not think that a respected scholar
could actually believe this ludicrous charge-I do think that September 11
exceptionalism can be taken too far. September 11 was an event, not a
justification in and of itself. It presents a challenge for scholars and
policymakers to discover its meaning and draw from it lessons for the
twenty-first century.
As Mary Dudziak poses the intellectual project, "This use of the idea
of change to justify new policies requires that we examine critically
whether this justification rests on a firm foundation, whether the idea of
transformation holds up under closer scrutiny, and whether any changes
are of the sort that would justify these new government policies."4 I turn
to this task in this lecture.
The attacks of September 11, and the composition of its perpetrators,
should make one lesson crystal clear: nation-states no longer possess a
monopoly on warfare or war-like violence. Nineteen individuals, with
several hundred thousand dollars, inflicted more damage and took more
lives in one day than even the mightiest of armies-and, I should add, they
did so against the nation that is currently the most powerful on earth. That
there are people who would wish such damage on us is neither new nor
surprising. What is surprising, however, is that they have both the will and

York, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 944, 946 (June 10, 2002).
2. Marilyn B. Young, Ground Zero: Enduring War, in SEPTEMBER 11 IN HISTORY: A
WATERSHED MOMENT? 10, 28 (Mary L. Dudziak ed., 2003).
3. Id.
4. Mary L. Dudziak, Introductionto SEPTEMBER 11 INHISTORY: AWATERSHEDMOMENT?,
supra note 2, at 8.
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the means to do so-that they were able to do that which no enemy nation
has ever been willing or able to do in the history of our country.
There were signposts leading to this lesson of September 11. For many
years, individual terrorists and terrorist organizations have sought and
articulated their desire to obtain state-like force. Timothy McVeigh
illustrated the ease of mass violence in even our own country. In that
sense, the breach on September 11 of nation-states' monopoly on force is
not a watershed. Rather, it only marked a turn, in a most dramatic and
catastrophic manner. Just as the twentieth century, dominated by wars
among nation-states, gave way to the twenty-first, September 11
threatened the replacement of the world order with an era of disorder.
In this new era, the Age of Terror, the threat to national and global
security comes not only, or even primarily, from individual nation-states.
Rather, the threat is posed collectively to nation-states by stateless
terrorists who believe fervently in their cause, but who owe no allegiance
to any particular place or polity.
This phenomenon of ideology unmoored from geography, coupled with
the means to inflict mass destruction, poses a pervasive and asymmetric
threat to the international order: pervasive because the international
terrorist movement is not really a movement at all; it is a loose network of
shared objectives and ideals. The threat is asymmetric because the new
warriors exploit the vulnerabilities of liberal democracies in order to inflict
terror on the masses. They engender fear by undermining the stability of
consequence. Acting without the tethers of a geographic base or the
restraint of a national polity, the enemy is faceless and, in this way,
impregnable.
This central lesson of September 11, that nation-states no longer have
a monopoly on the motives and means of war, has significant implications
in a whole host of areas of law, policy, and international relations.
My comments here will focus on the fundamentals: examining how
terrorism threatens not only American freedom or Western democracies,
but also the entire world order. That order is predicated on the nation-state
as the organizing unit of sovereignty-a predication that is being
challenged by organizations and individuals who operate statelessly,
employing terrorism as a means to advance their ideological ends.
I will first examine the development of the sovereign nation-state as the
basic unit of political organization and the way transnational terrorism
threatens the international order predicated upon such sovereignty. I will
follow this outside-in analysis with an inside-out look at how
patriotism--or to put it more bluntly, nationalism--contributes to the
maintenance of sovereignty and international order. I will conclude with
some thoughts on where all of this may lead us and, as important, where
a recommitment to national sovereignty and dedication to national ideals
should not lead us.
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THE NATION-STATE AND WESTPHALIAN ORDER

We start at the beginning, or to be precise, before the beginning of the
p6itical system as we know it. The year was 1612. Rudolf II, Emperor of
the Holy Roman Empire, died.5 Five contentious and tumultuous months
later, on June 13, his brother Matthias was elected to the Imperial throne.6
Bht the Empire that he inherited was hardly an empire as we would
imagine it. In this pre-sovereignty age, political power was split among
cities, duchies, kingdoms, leagues, unions, and empires. That power was
further divided between religious and secular authorities with no clear
lines demarcating where God left off and Caesar took over. Warfare was
a way of life, as rulers competed for territory, vied for power, and sought
revenge for personal insults. Amidst this hodgepodge of overlapping
allegiances, vague boundaries, and parchment compromises, the Protestant
Reformation swept through Europe, challenging the religious authority of
the Catholic church and dislodging its political authority over temporal
matters.7 These are the times that inspired Hobbes to posit the state of
nature, in which he aptly described life as "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish,
and short."'
Six years later, in 1618, "'a war of succession for a duchy near
Schleswig-Holstein"' 9 grew like a brush fire on a hot summer day,
spreading everywhere and consuming all. As The Cambridge Modern
History summarizes:
The quarrels of the Alpine leagues and those about the
Mantuan succession, the rivalries of the Scandanavian north
and of the Polish north-east, the struggle, only temporarily
suspended, of the United Provinces against Spain, the
perennial strife between Spain and France for predominance
in Italy and elsewhere-all contributed to the sweep of the
current. Even the Ottoman Empire was concerned in its
progress; for the "Turco-Calvinistic" combination announced
by the pamphleteers was by no means a mere hallucination.
"All the wars that are on foot in Europe," wrote Gustavus
Adolphus to Axel Oxenstierna in 1628, "have been fused
together, and have become a single war."'"

5. 4 THE CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY 1 (A.W. Ward et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press
1907).

6. Id.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id.at 5-6.
THoMAs HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 76 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1994) (1668).
4 THE CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, supra note 5, at v (quoting Lord Beaconsfield).
Id.
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This single war, the Thirty Years' War, wiped out the old Europe and
ushered in the new. On June 1, 1645, delegates convened in MOnster for
a peace conference with France and in Osnabrtick for a peace conference
with Sweden." The two towns, thirty miles apart in Westphalia, were
chosen to permit communications between the two Congresses and thus
to facilitate a global peace.' 2 On October 24, 1648, signatures were made
on The Treaty of Peace between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King
of France and their respective Allies and The Treaty of Peace between the
Holy Roman
Emperor and the King of Sweden and their respective
3
Allies. '
One would wade through the pages of these treaties and search in vain
for any mention of sovereignty. They were, like most peace treaties,
concerned with the terms of cessation of hostilities and the division of
territories to various warring parties.' 4 Unlike the ambiguous and often
meaningless treaties that preceded it, however, the Peace of Westphalia
delineated the limits of authority and territory between the Emperor and
the kings and among the kings and lords.' 5 As John Jackson puts it, "[T]he
compact represented the passing of some power from the emperor with his
claim of holy predominance, to many kings and lords who then treasured
their own local predominance. As time passed, this developed into notions
of the absolute right of the sovereign, and what we call 'Westphalian
sovereignty.1'16
From these beginnings, one can trace an unbroken intellectual and
diplomatic lineage to our current system of international law and
relations-from the Vienna peace treaty settling the Napoleonic Wars to
the Paris Peace Accords of 1919, through the League of Nations to the
Charter of the United Nations.' 7 The Peace of Westphalia was the first to
establish, in the words of a commentator in 1948, in the nascent days of
the United Nations, "something resembling world unity on the basis of
states exercising untrammeled sovereignty over certain territories and
subordinated to no earthly authority."' 8
This system of unity grounded in sovereignty does not seek to impose
global authority from one central ruler directly upon his subjects, as the
Holy Roman Emperor sought haplessly to do in the face of competing
11. Id. at 399.
12. Id. at 398.
13. Id. at 399; 1 MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISToRY: 1648-1967, at 7-49 (Fred L.
Israel ed., 1967).
14. John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approachtoan OutdatedConcept,97 AM.
J.INT'L L. 782, 786 (2003).

15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT'LL. 20, 21-24 (1948).
Id. at 20.
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claims to authority. Rather, it disaggregates political authority into discrete
units, each of them a hypothetical and juridical person with the autonomy
to determine his or her own actions and check the actions of others.
Through bilateral agreements and multilateral organizations, and by force
as necessary, these discrete units interact with each other to maintain the
uneasy but comparatively stable social compact that we call world order.
To qualify for international personhood, would-be nation-states must
prove their autonomy. In the language of the Montevideo Convention of
1933: "The state as a person of international law should possess the
following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory;
c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other
states."' 9 Each of these requirements serves to ensure proper
disaggregation and to support the critical assumptions of autonomous
personhood-that each unit can internally govern its territory and subjects
and externally interact with other units.
By so transforming the world of billions of actual persons into a club
of far fewer juridical persons-i 91 states, or 193 if one counts the Holy
See and Taiwan 2 0-the international community can bring order to the
chaotic task of governance. Citizens are answerable to nations, and nations
in turn are answerable to each other. The value of the nation-state as the
basic unit of political organization is perhaps best, and most relevantly,
illustrated by the use of force. Each sovereign has an internal monopoly
on the use of force within its jurisdiction. Each nation can project force
externally in order to wage war. Because preventing and limiting war is
the whole point of the exercise, the law of nations as it has traditionally
developed governs, first and principally, use of force.
Richard Haass summarizes well the concept of order grounded in
sovereignty and also highlights the challenges to that vision:
Historically, sovereignty has been associated with four
main characteristics: First, a sovereign state is one that enjoys
supreme political authority and a monopoly over the
legitimate use of force within its territory. Second, it is
capable of regulating movements across its borders. Third, it
can make its foreign policy choices freely. Finally, it is
recognized by other governments as an independent entity
entitled to freedom from external intervention. These
components of sovereignty were never absolute, but together
they offered a predictable foundation for world order. What
is significant today is that each of these
19. Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3097,3100, 165
L.N.T.S. 19, 25.
20. WIKIPEDIA, UNrrED NATIONS MEMBER STATES, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
UnitedNationsmemberstates (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
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components-internal authority, border control, policy
autonomy, and non-intervention-is being challenged in
unprecedented ways.2
The modem challenge to sovereignty comes from many sources: the
ascendancy of international institutions, the development of regional
unions, the delegation of governmental authority to non-state actors, the
impotence of weak or failing states, and other factors that have led to the
increasing irrelevance of the sovereign nation-state. Some scholars see
national sovereignty as an obstacle to regional and global governance;
others see national sovereignty as unnecessary in light of such governance
structures.22 Some, in this increasingly interdependent world, identify the
seeds of cosmopolitan citizenship as superior to claims of national
allegiance.23 To many others, sovereignty is an empty vessel, "of more
value for purposes of oratory and persuasion than of science and law."24
The title of one book seems to summarize the prevailing assault:
Sovereignty: OrganizedHypocrisy.25
These criticisms all challenge sovereignty-based order from within.
That is, they argue that nation-states, by their action or inaction, have so
manipulated or abused the concept of sovereignty that it has little or no
enduring analytical value. Indeed, one strand of criticism explores
sovereignty as a social construct and argues that "[n]umerous practices
participate in the social construction of a territorial state as sovereign. 26
Freed from its inherent characteristics and requirements, sovereignty can
be reconstructed to fit the policy or political needs of the day.

21. Ambassador Richard N. Haass, Remarks to the School of Foreign Service and the
Mortara Center for International Studies, Georgetown University (Jan. 14, 2003) (transcript
available at http://www.georgetown.edu/sfs/documents/haasssovereignty_20030114.pdf).
22. See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY
(1995) (critically analyzing what states, international organizations, officials, and other actors
actually do when trying to implement regulatory treaties); THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND
THE OLIVE TREE (1999) (arguing that globalization is the new international system that, more than
anything else, is shaping world affairs today); THE GREENING OF SOVEREIGNTY INWORLD POLrIICS

(Karen T. Liftin ed., 1998) (exploring whether existing political institutes, including the prevailing
norms of sovereignty, can be altered in ways that permit and even foster ecologically benign
practices).
23. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY? 3-17 (Joshua Cohen ed., 2002).
24. QUINCY WRIGHT, MANDATES UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 278 (Greenwood Press

1968).
25. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999).
26. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT 278 (Thomas J. Biersteker & Cynthia

Weber eds., 1996).
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THE TERRORIST CHALLENGE

Whatever the validity of these criticisms, they fundamentally differ
"from the external assault on sovereignty-based order mounted by stateless
ierrorism. Armed with the means and motives of war, and yet operating
outside the community of nations, the terrorist poses an external threat to
the ordering structure of that community. His access to the means of mass
violence breaks the monopoly on force held by sovereign nation-states.
His use of those means elides the nation-states' internal exercise of
monopoly power, criminal law-and their external projections, war. This
modem terrorist threat goes beyond ideology unmoored from geography.
It is, more accurately, force unchecked by sovereignty.
Knowing what we now know about al Qaeda, we can say that its
extremist, fundamentalist ideology is offensive to our liberal democratic
ideals. Al Qaeda seeks to subjugate women; we work for their liberation.
Al Qaeda seeks to deny choice; we celebrate the marketplace of ideas. Al
Qaeda seeks to suppress speech; we welcome open discussion.
Were al Qaeda a nation, we would deal with these differences the same
way we deal with nations with whom we have fundamental disagreements.
Subject to certain limits, we would respect its sovereignty. But we would
use our own sovereignty to bring political, diplomatic, and economic
pressure to cajole and coerce the nation of al Qaeda to adopt a more
humane and civilized exercise of its sovereign power. Nonetheless, were
al Qaeda a nation, many of its actions would fall outside the limits of
sovereignty. Vdclav Havel reminds us that "human life, human freedom
and human dignity represent higher values than State sovereignty."27 As
Kofi Annan declared in 1999, "If states bent on criminal behaviour know
that frontiers are not an absolute defence-that the [United Nations
Security] [C]ouncil will take action to halt the gravest crimes against
humanity-then they will not embark on such a course assuming they can
get away with it."2
Of course, al Qaeda is not a nation, and its offense to the United States
and other nations is not limited to its extremist ideology. By adopting the
way of terror, it has attacked not only our citizens in our territory, but also
the very foundation of world order grounded on sovereignty.
The terrorist does not seek to destroy the world ordered by sovereign
states within our social construct; the terrorist seeks to destroy that

27. Czech Republic President Viclav Havel, Opening Speech at the Conference "The
Transformation of NATO" (Nov. 20, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.nato.int/docu/
speech/2002/s021120c.htm).
28. Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, ECONOMIST (London), Sept. 18, 1999, at 49,
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construct. In this sense, the terrorist is fundamentally different from the
criminal offender normally encountered by the criminal justice system. By
attacking the foundation of order in a society, the terrorist seeks to
demolish the institutional structure that governs the lives of citizefis. By
fomenting terror among the masses, the terrorist seeks to incapacitate them
from exercising the liberty to pursue their individual ends. This action is
not mere criminality; it is a warlike attack on the polity.
In waging this war, the terrorist employs strategies that fundamentally
differ from those used by nations. The terrorist does not abide by
recognized rules of war; those rules were established among nations.
Rather, the terrorist exploits those rules to his advantage. Civilians are no
longer sacred; military installations arenot necessarily the primary targets.
By way of comparison, an enemy nation targets the instruments of our
defense; the terrorist targets the core of society. Unlike a nation, which is
subject to the vulnerabilities of a geographic territory and a defined
population and which thus appreciates the cost of war, the terrorist
appreciates only moral hazard: his movement does not absorb the cost and
therefore does not internalize the risk of his bellicose actions. The world
becomes his battleground-no country is immune from attack-and all
innocent civilians are exposed to the threat of wanton violence and are
incapacitated by the fear of terror.
This, then, is the enemy in the Age of Terror: a criminal whose
objective is not crime but fear; a mass murderer who kills only as a means
to a larger end; a warrior who exploits the rules of war; a war criminal who
recognizes no boundaries and who reaches all parts of the globe. Neither
endowed with the rights nor encumbered by the responsibilities of being
a person in the international community, the terrorist attacks that
community as a virus, moving from one person to the next, infecting each
indiscriminately with its lethal poison.
III. NATIONAL PRIDE, WORLD ORDER
Faced with such an external threat, we naturally turn inward to find a
spirit of national unity and resolve. Thomas Paine captured that spirit well
when he wrote on a drumhead the following words, which were read to
every soldier in the Continental Army:
These are the times that try men's souls. The summer
soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from
the service of their country; but he that stands it now,
deserves the love and thanks of man and woman. Tyranny,
like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolation
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with us, that the harder the conflict, the more glorious the
triumph.29
These are, indeed, times that try men's souls-and their hearts and their
minds. For under attack on September 11 were not only the obvious
trgets-the World Trade Towers, the Pentagon, the White House, or the
Capitol-but also the institutions and ideals that they represent. The
expressions of resolve after those attacks evoke our assent precisely
because we share a commitment to those institutions and ideals and to the
land that gave them birth and nurtured them.
This spirit of national pride fortifies each metaphorical person in the
international community by strengthening the body politic and building its
defenses against harmful infections. Nations are not built overnight. The
history, institutions, and memories of a people cultivate and reinforce their
mutual commitment to each other. As Michael Walzer describes the
process in his classic, Just and Unjust Wars: "Over a long period of time,
shared experiences and cooperative activity of many different kinds shape
a common life. 'Contract' is a metaphor for a process of association and
mutuality, the ongoing character of which the state claims to protect
against external encroachment."3 In his celebrated essay, Ernest Renan
poses the question "What is a Nation?" in the title and provides his
answer:
To have common glories in the past, a common will in the
present; to have accomplished great things together, to wish
to do so again, that is the essential condition for being a
nation.

A nation is a grand solidarity constituted by the sentiment
of sacrifices which one has made and those that one is
disposed to make again.3 '
A national identity can be born from a shared commitment to its core
principles, as the American example amply demonstrates. President
George W. Bush put it best in his Inaugural Address: "America has never
been united by blood or birth or soil. We are bound by ideals that move us

29. 2 THOMAS PAINE, The American Crisis, in THE LNE AND WORKS OFTHOMAS PAINE 263,
263 (William M. Van der Weyde ed., Patriots' ed. 1925).
30. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 54 (2d ed. 1992).
31. Ernest Renan, Qu 'est-ce qu 'une nation? (Ida Mae Snyder trans.), in NATIONALISM 17,

17 (John Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith eds., 1994).
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beyond our backgrounds, lift us above our interests and teach us what it
means to be citizens. 32
But patriotism means more than just intellectual attachment to a set of
principles. It is a commitment to the polity, and it is a shared sense of
belonging. Stephen Decatur delivered his famous toast in 1816 in this
spirit: "Our country! In her intercourse with foreign nations, may she
always be in the right; but our country, right or wrong. '33 The reflexive
and unyielding patriotism that his toast symbolizes has been much
criticized and even scorned, perhaps justly, on the ground that the
unconditional pledge of allegiance leaves too little room for exit or voice.
But loyalty there must be, even in dissent. "For patriotism," in Wilfred
and dies if it is not
McClay's eloquent words, "like any love, withers
34
accorded some degree of instinctive assent.
If patriotism is a kind of love, then it is unfortunately a love that often
dares not speak its name, especially in cosmopolitan academic circles.35 In
a highly influential 1996 essay, Martha Nussbaum argued that "this
emphasis on patriotic pride is both morally dangerous and, ultimately,
subversive of some of the worthy goals patriotism sets out to serve-for
example, the goal of national unity in devotion to worthy moral ideals of
justice and equality. ' 36 Labeling nationality as "morally irrelevant," 37 she
advocates for global identity, as defined by "allegiance . . . to the
worldwide community of human beings."3
These are by no means trivial objections, for we know all so well the
atrocities committed in the name of nationalism. But they underestimate
the value of the nation-state as the basic political unit of international
order. "International" presupposes "national." As Michael Walzer
answers:
I am not even aware that there is a world such that one could
be a citizen of it. No one has ever offered me citizenship, or
32. President George W. Bush, Inaugural Address, I PuB. PAPERS 1, 1 (Jan. 20, 2001).
33. Commodore Stephen Decatur, Toast at a Dinner in Norfolk, Virginia (Apr. 1816), in
ALEXANDER SUDELL MACKENZIE, LIFE OF STEPHEN DECATUR 295, 295 (1848).
34. Wilfred M. McClay, America-Idea or Nation?, PuB. TNT., Fall 2001, at 44, 53.
35. George Orwell famously wrote that "almost any English intellectual would feel more
ashamed of standing to attention during 'God Save the King' than of stealing from a poor box." 2
GEORGE ORWELL, The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius, in THE
COLLECTED ESSAYS, JOURNALISM, AND LETTERS OF GEORGE ORWELL 56, 75 (Sonia Orwell & Ian
Angus eds., David R. Godine 2000). Wilfred McClay makes the same observation in contemporary
American academia, where patriotism "must face a disdain even more deeply rooted than the incest
taboo." Wilfred M. McClay, The MixedNature ofAmerican Patriotism,SOCIETY, Nov./Dec. 2003,
at 37, 40.
36. Nussbaum, supra note 23, at 4.
37. Id. at5.
38. Id. at 4.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 5 [2004], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 56

described the naturalization process, or enlisted me in the
world's institutional structures, or given me an account of its
decision procedures (I hope they are democratic), or provided
me with a list of the benefits and obligations of citizenship,
or shown me the world's calendar and the common
celebrations and commemorations of its citizens.39
Nussbaum acknowledges, of course, that there is no world state and
does not necessarily advocate for one. Instead, she argues that nationalism,
not nationality, stands in the way of cosmopolitanism." But as much as we
like to think globally, we love locally: "To be attached to the subdivision,
to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle (the
germ as it were) of public affections. It is the first link in the series by
which we proceed towards a love to our country, and to mankind."' As
Michael McConnell puts it, "We will not love those distant from us more
'
by loving those close to us less."42
That we love those close to us, of course, does not mean that we cannot
love those distant from us. And it certainly does not mean that we can
disrespect them. Indeed, loving one's country allows one to love others
more. Liberal democracy requires a healthy dose of mutual commitment.
Countermajoritarian norms, protection of minority rights, and
redistributive justice go against parochial self-interest and take a lot of
enlightenment-the empathy and commitment that national identity and
unity facilitates.
Finally, loving our country-loving this country-allows us (indeed
requires us) to love others more. As President George W. Bush
expounded, "Unlike any other country, America came into the world with
a message for mankind, that all are created equal, and all are meant to be
free. There is no American race. There's only an American creed: We
believe in the dignity and rights of every person .... Walter Berns
sounds the same theme in Making Patriots,published in early 2001:
What makes us "one people" is not where we were born
but, rather, our attachment to those principles of government,
namely, that all men are created equal insofar as they are
equally endowed by nature's God with the unalienable rights

39. Michael Walzer, Spheres ofAffection, in NUSSBAUM, supra note 23, at 125, 125.
40. Nussbaum, supra note 23, at 4.
41. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIoNsON THE REVOLUTION INFRANCE 40 (Frank M. Turner ed.,
2003).
42. Michael W. McConnell, Don 'tNeglecttheLittle Platoons, in NUSSBAUM, supra note 23,
at 78, 82.
43. President George W. Bush's Remarks at a"Saluting Our Veterans" Celebration in Ripley,
West Virginia, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1138, 1139 (July 4, 2002).
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to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and that the
purpose of government is "to secure these rights."
Loyalty to our nation thus fosters a commitment to universal principles.
It is not at all evident that rejection of national identity would foster global
brotherhood-indeed, quite the opposite is more plausible. Nussbaum
acknowledges that "[b]ecoming a citizen of the world is often a lonely
business. It is... a kind of exile-from the comfort of local truths,' from
the warm, nestling feeling of patriotism, from the absorbing drama of
' I am not sure that the destination
pride in oneself and one's own."45
justifies the journey. Rather than aspiring to universal cosmopolitanism,
statelessness may well foster reversion to a selfish individualism. Much
worse and more relevant to our discussion here, a rudderless person in
search of a fundamental identity may well find himself or herself in the
comfort of zealotry and the community of terror.
IV. SOME PRESCRIPTIVE THOUGHTS

Where does this analysis lead us? First, we need to reaffirm the
monopoly of nation-states on external projections of force. Fundamental
to sovereignty-based order are the rules governing use of force among
nations. War is traditionally a right reserved to sovereign nations as a last
resort; even in self-defense, nations are to attempt peaceful resolution
before resorting to violent retaliation. When war is unavoidable, it is
fought in defined zones among identifiable combatants who are restricted
by international agreements that define permissible combat tactics.
Terrorists seek to exploit the rules of war by defying all restrictions on the
use of force, and they seek to disorient their enemies by blurring the lines
between war and crime. They act without the tethers of sovereignty, with
no accountability to the international community, and with no regard for
the conventions of combat. The rules of war must be fortified and applied
to the framework of war waged on a universal battlefield by unidentified
combatants with indiscriminate targets.
Second, we need to enforce vigorously the nation-states monopoly on
internal force to prevent terrorist crimes. Disruption of terrorist activity
has become the overarching goal of law enforcement. Law enforcement
agencies have sought to further this objective by removing suspected
terrorists from our streets before their plans can come to fruition. Material
support and money laundering laws allow for apprehension and
prosecution of those who would seek to assist a terrorist's efforts.46 A

44. WALTER BERNS, MAKING PATRIOTS 50 (2001).

45. Nussbaum, supra note 23, at 15.
46. See generally Ankush Agarwal, Comment, ObstructingJustice: The Rise andFall of the
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suspected terrorist who commits any criminal violation, no matter how
minor, will face apprehension and prosecution. While our military
continues to hunt down terrorists abroad, law enforcement tools need to be
deployed aggressively to ensure that terrorists are tracked down at home.
Third, neither military strategy nor preventive prosecution can succeed
without effective, coordinated intelligence. Prior to September 11,
intelligence and law enforcement operated independently of one another;
intelligence focused on detecting threats from abroad, while law
enforcement prosecuted crime at home. In the War on Terror, intelligence
must serve as a bridge, not a barrier, if both the military and law
enforcement are to effectively combat the threat. Intelligence and law
enforcement agencies have adapted to these needs by combining increased
intelligence-sharing with more actionable intelligence; agencies are
working together to determine who poses a threat, where they can be
found, and how they can be apprehended. Assisted by essential
technological advancements, these shifts in intelligence have led to critical
victories both in capturing terrorists abroad and removing suspected
terrorists from our streets.
Fourth, the September 11 hijackers gained entry to our country not by
force, but by exploiting the ease of international travel and the weaknesses
in the enforcement of our immigration law. By enforcing rational
immigration rules already in place, we can remove or deny entry to those
who would penetrate our borders in furtherance of terrorism.47 Any
suspected terrorist who overstays a visa becomes subject to detention and
deportation.48 Visas will be denied to suspected terrorists who request
them.49 Returning the rule of law to the immigration laws minimizes the
need for harsher measures. By using available intelligence and technology
to enforce the laws we have, we ensure that our doors remain open to those
who seek entry for the promise and opportunity America offers. A
commitment to inspiring American ideals among immigrants will also
help foster their dedication to the freedom and liberty for which we are
fighting.
Fifth, the ease with which goods can be moved across international
borders facilitates terrorists' efforts to acquire weapons and provides a
AEDPA, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 839 (2004) (examining the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 as a means to deter terrorism post-September 11).
47. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,812 (Oct. 8, 2001); Homeland
Security Director Tom Ridge, Press Briefing (Nov. 2, 2001) (transcript available at 2001 WL
1346159).
48. President George W. Bush, Remarks on Immigration Policy (Jan. 7, 2004) (transcript
available at 2004 WL 33672); OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS, WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET:
INCREASING INFORMATION SAFEGUARDS AND IMPROVING VITAL INFORMATION SHARING (Oct. 29,

2001), availableat 2001 WL 1326237.
49. See sources cited supra note 48.
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global stage on which terrorists can act. The September 11 targeting of the
World Trade Towers-the nerve center of the global
economy-demonstrates the terrorists' strategy of exploiting international
interdependence to disrupt world order. Terrorists have sought to execute
this strategy through technologically sophisticated methods" of
communicating and through coordination and financing across countiies
and continents. The international community has recognized that such a
global attack demands a global response. Terrorism is an international
crime.5° Each country therefore must help shoulder the burden by finding
and apprehending terrorists within its borders, stopping terrorist financing
in its economy, interrupting the flow of weapons through its borders, and
exchanging information pertaining to terrorism with the international
community.
Finally, neither the global effort against terrorism nor the sovereigntybased world order can be sustained unless each member of the
international community maintains legitimate sovereignty. Nations whose
governments have been infiltrated by terrorism and its supporters will
require international intervention to restore the security necessary to
maintain a stable world order. We should help fortify weak or failing
states, while maintaining humility in efforts at nation-building in foreign
lands. Rolodex constitutionalism has proven ineffective in past attempts;
the rule of law, control of borders, and consent of the people must be
secured for any nation to take on the rights and responsibilities of
membership in the international community. National mutual commitment
takes time and effort; commitment to universal ideals displacing parochial
ones takes even longer. We should appreciate the genius of federal
arrangements that allow for both local civic acculturation and national
aggregation. Establishing these prerequisites for order will often require
a long-term international economic and military commitment, but in the
War on Terror, the benefits of that commitment far outweigh the potential
consequences of allowing terrorism to take root.

In many ways, the global community is currently navigating
uncharted territory-we are at war with nihilistic terrorists instead of
rogue nation-states. During these times, when the foundation of liberty is
under attack, it is critical that each nation-state celebrates the stability of
order grounded in sovereignty. Stability is fostered by the nation-state as
the basic building block of world order. Each of these blocks forms an
element of a communal wall against terrorism; a wall fortified from within

50. See Leila Nadya Sadat, Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L.
REv. 135, 145-52 (2004).
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by each state's efforts to prosecute terrorist enemies; a wall fortified from
without as a means to stand up to the terrorist challenge to global order.
Like any structure with a function, a wall is dependent on the strength of
its components. Weak blocks make weak walls. Likewise, weak states
leave us all more susceptible and more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.
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